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Abstract 
An instructive graphical macroeconomic theory is recapitulated describing the 
interaction of private production of commercial services with natural production of 
ecosystem services.  It features investments in maintaining the health of natural 
capital and analysis of marginal changes in absolute metrics of private and natural 
capital productivity.  Analysis of trade-offs among costs, benefits and wealth 
production explore macroeconomic trajectories employing sustained yield doctrine, low-
impact technologies, green technologies, artificial production of ecosystem services, 
debt-financed natural capital investments and a more probable scenario.  Sustained 
yield won’t work as a policy or prescriptive framework.  Widespread restoration of 
robust ecosystems is unlikely, but resilient natural capital systems may be possible.  
Large investments in natural capital restoration and low-impact green technologies are 
required while retaining reasonable levels of profitability in both the commercial and 
ecosystem restoration sectors.  The role of projected innovation in achieving long-term 
sustainability and climate stability is projected and unresolved issues identified. 
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1. Introduction 
The Model of Macroeconomic Real Values (MMERV) is an instructive graphical theory 
(Figure 1).  It offers a formal and more rigorous approach to broad problems of 
ecological economics than prevailing conceptual argumentation.  It also posits that 
avoiding collapse is now a major problem for all macroeconomic theory and research.  
The MMERV visually describes trajectories of economic behavior in logical time driven 
by how nations or planets might cope with the conflicts between private capital 
production versus that from ‘free’ self-organizing forms of public capital.  The latter 
might be climate systems, ecosystems, or other forms of evolved and resilient cultural 
or institutional systems.  These trajectories might be sustainable and a few simplified 
scenarios are explored through MMERV graphs.  Basic ‘free and natural’ macroeconomic 
behaviors are considered first followed by more policy-driven prescriptive options and 
long-term macroeconomic trajectories.  The component curves of the basic MMERV and how 
they relate to each other are as follows. 
 
Figure 1. Graphical exposition of the basic Macroeconomic Model of Real Values 
1.1 Natural capital production 
The downward curve all the way across Figure 1 tracks the health of dynamic natural 
capital systems as it is increasingly stressed by growing and intensifying private 
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capital deployments over time (Davies and Jackson, 2006).  The levels of ecosystems’ 
health along this curve can be understood as levels of natural capital wealth by virtue 
of the production of ecosystem services, that begins at its maximum potential level 
prior to any stresses at the left edge of Figure 1.  These systems’ robustness allows 
their functional health to decline slowly upon initial stresses.  A tipping point of 
lost robustness is passed as further stresses compromise ecosystems’ adaptive and 
regenerative capacities and natural capital wealth then declines rapidly.  At another 
tipping point, as these loses decline most rapidly, aggregate natural capital systems 
loose their resilience in sustaining ecosystem services under the pressures of 
impactful exploitation or uncertain and surprising disturbances (Muradian, 2001).  
Failing ecosystem services then impose growing and compounding compulsory costs on 
human societies and economies, illustrated by the unfolding impacts of climate change.  
Further stresses eventually cause natural capital to fail, and its path-dependent 
complex, self-organizing systems may not recover for many human generations. 
 
1.2. Fabricated private capital production 
The bell shaped curve in Figure 1 tracks the value of private, fabricated production 
of marketable goods and services over time and is similar to a related curve proposed 
by Matutinovic et al. (2016).  It begins at zero, at the start of economic development, 
and rises at first convexly with increasing marginal returns as more and better 
technology is employed up to the point of diminishing returns (PDR).  Private 
production then grows concavely with diminishing marginal returns until it peaks at the 
point of maximum possible production (MPP), given a set of available technologies and 
the associated externality impacts that negatively affect real economic growth.  As 
still more private capital is deployed, the curve declines concavely as the compounding 
costs of lost ecosystem services increasingly offset and overwhelm gains in private 
production from private capital (Daly and Farley, 2011, p. 20). 
This curve’s tragic shape is fundamentally essential to ecological economics.  It 
assumes that economic development is optimized, without making mistakes, all the way 
across Figure 1 according to established growth theory.  The best proportions of 
capital, labor and resource employment are correctly discovered and adjusted to 
overcome or prevent recessions or depressions (Solow, 1956).  The reversal of growth in 
Figure 1 is instead due to factors beyond firms’ direct control that mainstream 
development theory discounts, ignores or forgets.  These are externality costs that 
firms spread elsewhere in space and time which rapidly grow due to compounding natural 
capital failures until they circle back en masse as compulsory and crushing private 
costs (Hardin, 1968; Diamond, 2004).  Conventional economists do not readily 
contemplate this potential novel and disastrous outcome because they are dominantly 
disciplined only by past experience and data rather than the complex sciences of 
environmental dynamics and evolutionary emergence (Hodgson, 1997).  What has not been 
recently observed and understood is presumed to be so improbable as to be outside 
warranted science. 
 
1.3. Private capital maintenance 
The upward sloping curve in Figure 1 tracks the costs to all private parties of 
maintaining all manner of fabricated capital, or anthropogenic assets, that they own.  
It begins at zero when there is no private capital to maintain.  It rises slowly at 
first as there is little and mostly new technological capital, but then rises convexly 
with increasing steepness as there is ever more older and obsolete capital to be 
maintained or replaced. 
 
1.4. The ‘natural’ trajectory of economic development 
In a maximally free and ‘natural’ economy deployment of private capital stops at 
Point A in Figure 1.  This is where the marginal value of added aggregate private 
production equals its coincident marginal private costs.  Further net employment of 
capital will not be profitable.  This is not an ideal, stable, equilibrium ‘settlement 
point’ from comparative statics theory in economics.  There is no production of 
ecosystem services at Point A because natural capital systems have failed and 
consequently the private economy is already in freefall, likely with social instability 
and strife (Beck, 1999).  This is the doomsday outcome that motivates ecological 
economics.  It necessitates a different economic ‘settlement point’ further to the left 
in Figure 1, where production of commercial goods is not rapidly declining, natural 
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capital systems have not failed, and those systems remain resilient to sustain human 
life and an economy. 
 
1.5. Radically grounded value theory 
The MMERV asserts that the values on the left and right axes in Figure 1 are 
commensurate and both can be measured in a monetary metric off the left axis.  Both 
axes measure an absolute amount of production on a ratio scale grounded at a real zero 
value at the bottom of Figure 1.  The full height of both production curves are matched 
at their maximum potentials to give both forms of capital equal value standing.  This 
equating of commercial and ecological potentials is necessary to keep natural capital 
assets within sustainably functional bounds (Perrings, 1991).  Commercial goods and 
services are presumed equally essential to human needs and social survival as ecosystem 
services.  This method of commensurate valuation is deeply radical to conventional 
economics, which typically only admits valuations measured by comparative marginal 
changes along abstracted, self-referential interval scales, i.e. market prices (Gramm, 
1988; Fourcade, 2011).  The MMERV instead employs real values measured on normatively 
meaningful ratio scales to account for the wealth associated with ecosystem services, 
as opposed to ungrounded marginal prices on interval scales (Pearce and Hamilton, 
1996). 
 
2. Investments in Natural Capital 
The objective of ecological macroeconomics is to prevent the ‘natural’ settlement 
point of economic behavior from reaching Point A in Figure 1.  It might instead remain 
closer to the point of maximum potential production (MPP) where private productivity is 
not yet declining in ways attributable to natural capital degradation and natural 
capital productivity has not failed and might remain resilient. 
This is achieved by investments in natural capital maintenance depicted in Figure 2.  
The added cost of such investments moves the total maintenance cost curve up, as shown 
by the arrows pointing up and to the left.  This effects a new ‘settlement point’ of A’ 
at a higher level of long-term private production.  These investments also lift the 
natural capital productivity curve up, as shown by the arrows pointing up and to the 
right, so that natural capital productivity is no longer below its tipping point into 
failure.  The private capital productivity curve has fallen, as shown by the downward 
pointing arrows, due to the reallocation of resources from private capital production 
to that of needed ecosystem services.  Figure 2 also shows gains and losses in these 
over logical time to Point A’, as well as associated changes in short-term new private 
wealth creation. 
 
Figure 2. Wealth effects and production gains and losses along logical time in the 
basic MMERV. 
 4 
The reformed macroeconomic behavior ‘settling’ at Point A’ in Figure 2 is still 
suboptimal.  It is difficult to redraw that graph to depict a better result in ways 
consistent with reasonable interactions of the component curves, i.e. lost natural 
capital resilience must be associated with declining private productivity in logical 
time, albeit not perfectly in real time.  Point A’ is suboptimal because long-term 
private production is not maximized near Point MPP; and the natural capital health 
curve is too low there.  It is below the tipping point of lost resilience and not 
sustainable over the long term.  The following sections explore solutions to these 
deficiencies. 
 
3. The Sustained Yield Solution? 
 
3.1 Old theory and the essentials of a solution 
Conventional environmental macroeconomics and policy often advocates an alternative 
optimal ‘settlement point’ in economic development, at Point MPP in Figure 1.  
Declining ecological stability and resilience, and declining ecosystem services, can 
contribute to diminishing positive returns to private capital up to that point; but 
further losses in natural capital productivity should be prevented if they are expected 
to eventually effect a decline in private production.  This is the doctrine of 
“sustained yield” from natural resources, often applied to limit fish catches or timber 
harvests at their rates of natural regeneration (Brown, et al., 1987).  This theory of 
sustainable development (Goodland, 1995) is described in Figure 3, except now with a 
revised horizontal axis whereby the intensity of ecosystem exploitation somehow ‘stops’ 
at a value of ‘60’ at the maximum sustainable production of private services along an 
arbitrarily enumerated scale there. 
 
Figure 3. A macroeconomic trajectory describing the sustained yield theory of economic 
development. 
The idealistic conventional sustained yield theory depicted in Figure 3 entails 
freezing private capital deployment using prevailing available technology that 
determines its maximum productivity at Point MPP.  New ‘green’ technologies that 
increase private production without imposing any additional stresses on natural systems 
may be invented (Jänicke, 2012) represented by the dashed curve on top of Figure 3.  
With or without this additional ‘green’ growth, Figure 3 does suggest an objective for 
sustainable development graphical theory: to have steady or growing private production 
while maintaining a resilient level of natural capital production. 
 
3.2. Fallacies of sustained yield theory 
The flaws in this sustained yield theory relate to its facile comparative statics 
solution where ‘time conveniently stops’ whence at graphical optimum, but mainly to 
several unsupportable assumptions. 
One flaw involves how the natural productivity curve must be drawn very high at this 
‘stopping point’ in Figure 3 to make sustained yield theory viable, as opposed to how 
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it is more realistically drawn in Figure 1.  This artificially high natural 
productivity curve assumes that damages to natural capital incurred up to maximized 
private production will not produce future irreversible losses in the fundamental 
productivity of natural capital (Cleveland, 2003) so as not to compromise nature’s 
permanent resilient functioning (Figure 3).  For example, converting a forest to a 
regularly harvested monoculture of a commercially optimal tree type is assumed to be as 
resilient as a more diverse forest resembling a native forest. 
This belief in magically beneficent nature in all modified or exploited forms is 
more a matter of economic or cultural faith than empirical fact.  Damages to self-
organizing, complex-adaptive, natural capital systems are path-dependent and self 
compounding so the ‘train wreck’ to their lost resilience and ultimate failure may be 
well under way before maximum potential private production is reached (Perrings et al., 
1995).  This is why the natural capital productivity curve declines much faster in 
Figure 1 than in Figure 3.  Private production may actually begin declining -- due to 
failing and unstable ecosystem service flows -- when it is too late to reverse the 
damages at acceptable costs even if it is technically possible (Barbier, 2011). 
Another related flaw in sustained yield development theory is its assumption that 
the predominant or only measure needed to sustain natural systems’ resilience is to 
stop their rate of exploitation at some carrying capacity (the magic value of 60 in 
Figure 3).  At such a sustained yield point, there are assumed to be no substantial, 
non-commercial private investments, or commercial opportunity costs, required to keep 
natural systems in resilient functioning.  The simple prescription of limiting harvests 
(i.e. of fish or timber) assumes that ecosystems will forever remain robust or 
adequately resilient to reliably regenerate these harvested ecosystem services.  
Unexpected disturbances, uncontrollable events, and cumulative impacts from other 
indirectly related commercial activities will inevitably compromise ecosystems 
maintained on the edge of exploitive collapse (Biggs et al., 2009).  Additional direct 
interventions in ecological rehabilitation will therefore also be needed and these 
investments and their private costs are not included in Figure 3. 
The sustained yield growth theory specified in Figure 3 assumes that natural capital 
productivity does not decline very much in the run-up to maximized private production.  
People will somehow be guided to carefully choose ecologically gentle forms of private 
capital and deploy them at a careful rate that prevents permanent damage to the 
resilience of natural capital systems; whereas history shows that economic competition 
almost always compels people and newly developing economies to do otherwise (Stern, et 
al, 1996). 
The trajectory in Figure 3 also assumes that natural capital productivity will 
indefinitely remain stable at a low but resilient carrying capacity while maximum 
private production is indefinitely sustained.  But persistent high levels of private 
wealth-maximizing exploitive stress on any complex adaptive system, whether natural, 
cultural, political or economic will likely inevitably compromise its resilience, 
particularly with inevitable, uncertain and outside disturbances (Holling, 2001). 
Once the carrying capacity of natural capital is reached in Figure 3 sustained yield 
theory assumes that everyone will somehow agree upon and successfully enforce “mutual 
coercion, mutually agreed upon” (Hardin, 1968) to prevent deployment of more or new 
private capital that damages natural systems past their aggregate tipping point of lost 
resilience.  This is a highly problematic assumption (Ostrum et al., 2002).  People 
must accept that no more private capital production is to be gained above its ‘fixed’ 
maximum at Point MPP in Figure 3.  The inexorable arrow of time, constant change, 
enterprising human nature, and inevitable new problems that must be solved all defy 
social acceptance of a stable economic equipoise.  All the requisite complex self-
organizing social and economic processes driven by problem solving, ambition, 
innovation, competition, the need to create surplus wealth to pay for these adaptive 
activities and more are assumed away. 
 
3.3. Compulsory tragedy? 
The obvious must be noted. Figure 3 incorporates the naïveté of sustained yield’s 
behavioral assumptions.  It wills away the arrow of time and mathematical logic of the 
tragedy of the commons.  Increased deployment of impactful private capital produces 
short-term gains concentrated toward consumers and private capital owners via 
commercial markets and purchasing-power incomes.  Natural capital costs are spread into 
the future and thinly onto many people and these only indirectly and eventually impact 
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private wealth.  Fixing the level of private capital at Point MPP not only attempts to 
stop time; it denies people’s compulsion to deploy more impactful private capital 
beyond natural systems’ carrying capacity in search of new wealth.  New technologies 
will be invented, and these likely may not be benign to the bearing capacity of natural 
capital like those that produce the dashed growth curve at the top of Figure 3. 
Figure 4 describes a trajectory consistent with this compulsion.  It would apply if 
new technologies offer a higher MPP’ but also break down the resilience of natural 
capital.  Deployment of such new private capital will be hard to resist because 
additional short-term new wealth creation exceeds long-term lost new wealth, as 
indicated in Figure 4.  The ‘settlement point’ for the macroeconomic behavior in Figure 
4 is now Point X, but the applicable natural capital productivity curve is now the one 
at the bottom of Figure 4 so this economy will crash like that in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. A trajectory describing abandonment of sustained yield. 
4. Green Private Capital Contributions 
The ‘natural’ doomsday economic theory in Figure 1, and the inadequacies of the 
theoretical solutions in Figures 2-4, suggest that more ‘unnatural’ economic behaviors  
are needed.  These can be new investments in alternative private capital that is less 
damaging to natural capital, in addition to the sunk private costs in maintaining 
natural capital shown in Figure 2.  Such ‘green’ fabricated capital would produce the 
same or more private goods and services at much lower costs to natural capital systems.  
These additional investments are shown in Figure 5.  The overall cost curve has risen 
again compared to Figure 2, moving the ‘settlement point’ from the previous A’ to A”.  
Costs now include added private research and development costs of green technology, 
short-term opportunity costs of forgoing the deployment of conventional ‘brown’ 
technology, and government or other subsidies needed to compensate private capital 
owners for these short-term losses to produce long-term public benefits. 
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Figure 5. A trajectory adding investments in green technology to those in natural 
capital maintenance. 
The private capital productivity curve in Figure 5 has risen to make up for some or 
all private capital losses found in Figure 2.  This is because green technology enables 
restored production of private services as a replacement for the brown technology that 
had to be forgone in moving from Point A to A’ in Figure 2.  The natural capital 
productivity curve in Figure 5 has optimistically risen above the tipping-point level 
of lost natural capital resilience; assuming that green technology might substantially 
reduce the stress on natural capital systems with each step of capital application to 
the right across Figure 5.  This theoretical economy, now at Point A”, has reached the 
target for sustainability set out in Section 3.1 and Figure 3, but potentially without 
the artificial, onerous and unpopular command-and-control sustained yield measures to 
freeze stresses on natural capital.  Figure 5 describes a sustainable economy that may 
not crash.  But it artificially ‘sits’ at the Point A” ‘settlement point’ that cannot 
be frozen in equipoise forever, an issue that will be explored in Sections 6 and 7. 
 
4.1. Gains and losses from green private capital 
Figure 6 is the same as Figure 5, but with five areas of total short-term value 
gains and losses mapped as a consequence of investments in green private capital from 
Point A’ to Point A”.  Gains in natural capital productivity are substantial.  Gains 
and losses in private capital productivity over logical time roughly offset each other.  
Gains in private production occur with lost new wealth creation, with the gains going 
to firms that successfully invest in green technology and ‘own’ the rise in the private 
capital productivity curve up to Point A”.  Other firms would be ‘weeded out’.  While 
new private wealth creation is about the same in Figure 6 at Point A” as in Figure 2 at 
Point A’, both these are still substantially less than such gains in the unsustainable 
economy in Figure 1 at Point A. 
 8 
 
Figure 6. Wealth effects and production gains and losses along logical time with added 
investments in green technology. 
5. Whither Robust Ecosystems? 
The same macroeconomic behavior in Figures 5 and 6 ‘settles’ at a much more 
sustainable ‘optimum’ at point A”, but natural capital health has only maintained 
resilience and not robustness.  The MMERV posits that investments in both natural 
capital and green technology will be insufficient to allow natural systems to regain 
historically high biodiversity and self-organized complexity to be maximally adaptive 
to inevitable major disturbances or unexpected stresses.  Natural capital will remain 
too stressed and subject to irreversible damages.  These impacts are associated with 
the diminishing, but still positive, returns to private capital as the economy 
approaches point A” (from the left) in Figure 5. 
The theoretical solution to these deficits in maximum sustainability would be the 
macroeconomic behavior in Figure 7.  Additional investments in natural capital have 
raised the natural capital health curve up to a robust level.  As drawn, there is about 
as much gain in the productivity of natural capital as losses to private production. 
 
Figure 7. A trajectory attempting to restore ecosystems’ robustness. 
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The further investments in natural capital in Figure 7 represent more diversion of 
resources from private capital development to natural capital maintenance, which has 
raised the cost curve more than in Figure 6.  The corresponding drop in the private 
capital productivity curve is not drawn in Figure 7 for graphical simplicity but could 
be appreciable.  This behavior leads to a new ‘settlement point’ at A’’’, back and down 
the private capital productivity curve.  This has eliminated some of the natural 
capital damage that would otherwise have effected some diminishing positive returns to 
private capital had the settlement point A” instead been achieved.  This move downward 
in private productivity from Point A” to A’” effects a double private cost not found in 
previous graphs.  Forgone returns to private capital, by not getting up to Point A”, 
are now added to the natural capital investment costs entailed by moving from Point A” 
to A’”.  These comprise the high cost of maintaining insurance against long-term 
economic instability that ecological robustness provides. 
Of more immediate consequence is the ‘profit squeeze’ in Figure 7.  Most short-term 
gains in new wealth creation are eliminated.  New wealth is needed as an economic 
surplus for problem solving and making creatively adaptive investments in private, 
natural and public capital.  Wealth creation that is retained in Figure 7 is, by 
inspection, very probably insufficient for these purposes, likely rendering this 
economic behavior favoring robust ecosystems unsustainable.  The MMERV suggests that 
massive investments in natural capital systems to maintain robustly diverse ecosystems 
are not a viable option. 
 
6. Trajectories of Long-term Ecological Economic Evolution 
Point A” in Figures 5 and 6 represents a peak ‘settlement’ condition of sustainable 
development in logical, not real, time.  It is where the MMERV indicates the prosperous 
deployment of private capital will stop due to necessary and substantial investments in 
natural capital maintenance and green technology.  More private capital deployment 
instead of these investments would be unprofitable, in the short-term welfare economic 
sense, only if the value of natural capital is accounted for using the value theory of 
the MMERV.  This is required to produce sustainable development. 
The macroeconomic behavior described by Figures 5 and 6 is likely impossible.  It 
‘settles’ at a kind of steady state or equipoise of private capital constrained by the 
needs of natural capital systems.  Time does not stop and the world never settles down 
into stability.  The very process of economic growth up to Point A” causes scaling 
effects on all social and ecological systems that require never-ending adaptive 
evolution (West, 2017).  Populations grow.  New problems arise.  People are 
enterprising.  Ecosystems change.  Innovations happen.  New economic surpluses are 
needed to support these creative and adaptive processes. 
The arrows in Figure 8 depict postulated ways that a sustainable economy can evolve 
and grow.  They denote evolutionary changes that can allow the sustainable ‘settlement 
point’ at A” to move up and to the right.  Green technological innovations can increase 
production of private goods while incurring little damage to natural systems, or may 
incur damages that are much less costly to prevent or reverse than the coincident 
private value created.  This would correspond to the whole private capital productivity 
curve moving up, indicated by the ‘A’ arrows in Figure 8.  Development of more 
efficient or effective green technology or natural capital maintenance techniques can 
improve the resilience of natural capital systems at the same or less cost.  This would 
correspond to a rise in the natural capital productivity curve, indicated by the ‘B’ 
arrows.  Less costly or more cost-effective techniques for ecological restoration and 
maintenance might be invented, or the same might also be achieved for private capital 
maintenance costs.  Either or both would correspond to the total all-capital 
maintenance curve moving down, indicated by the ‘C’ arrows. 
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Figure 8. Ways that economies might evolve toward sustainability. 
The two arrows next to the ‘D’ in Figure 8 denote a more radical theoretical 
possibility in producing sustainable economic growth.  This would involve the 
obsolescence of natural capital systems.  New forms of private capital might replace 
natural capital in providing the same or substitute services that natural capital 
systems previously provided.  This replacement could ‘harmlessly’ allow a drop in the 
natural capital productivity curve, indicated by the arrow above the ‘D’ in Figure 8.  
This drop in ecosystems’ health might not have its previous indirect and adverse 
consequences on private capital productivity, so the downward-sloping tail of the 
private capital productivity curve would rise, indicated by the arrow below the ‘D’ in 
Figure 8.  Investments in natural capital would also be less necessary, so total all-
capital maintenance costs would lessen, corresponding to another cause of the ‘C’ 
arrows in Figure 8. 
 
6.1. Sustainable growth over time? 
If an economy were to achieve the sustainable development settlement point A” in 
Figures 5 and 6, could it grow sustainably from there and produce new private wealth?  
Figure 9 describes the theoretical solution entailing persistent green innovation 
(Solow, 1974; Clark and Juma, 2013; Gowdy, 1994).  It describes a theory similar to a 
mathematical one developed for energy and climate change by Ayres (1987).  The letters 
represent a successive flow of comparative static ‘settlement points’ along a gradually 
growing trajectory of private production.  Private capital productivity would have to 
keep improving in ways that harmonize with long-term natural capital resilience (Ekins, 
1999), marked by the lower time-step arrows pushing the private capital curve up in 
Figure 9.  Less costly maintenance of natural capital would have to be simultaneously 
and continuously deployed, indicated by the upper arrows pushing the all-capital 
maintenance cost curve down.  Those aggregate costs would have to be reliably less than 
the total receipts from private capital to maintain a normal profit margin, shown by 
the difference between the long-term trajectory curves at the top of Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Long-term evolution of the solution in Figure 5. 
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6.2. Muddling down softly 
If the sustainable macroeconomic behaviors posited in Figures 5 and then 9 fail to 
occur, some technically and politically feasible investments in natural capital 
restoration and maintenance may still occur.  This could achieve a halfway sustainable 
condition like that in Figure 2, which might produce a future trajectory like that in 
Figure 10.  From the settlement point in Figure 2, viable further investments in 
natural capital would be made, but these would not be enough to achieve long-term 
natural capital resilience.  The consequent attenuated losses in natural capital health 
would more gradually impose costs upon private capital productivity, probably with 
shortening temporal lags over time.  Losses in ecosystem health could be more gradual, 
forestalling inevitable collapse perhaps for generations.  In more developed economies 
where this scenario may more likely prevail, gradual aggregate losses in genuine 
private wealth derived from natural capital failures may be ‘papered-over’ by fiscal 
accounting gymnastics and monetary engineering to maintain vital nominal positive 
returns on private capital (Seeley, 2017). 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Trajectory of muddling down softly to delayed collapse. 
6.3 Replacing natural capital with fabricated capital 
Growing losses in essential ecosystem services, due to the deficit in natural 
capital investment tracked in Figure 10, might be made up for by the ‘artificial’ 
production or co-production of ecosystem services by fabricated capital.  This highly 
speculative scenario would require massive and timely invention and deployment of 
innovations to compensate for declining health of increasingly unstable natural 
capital.  These would have to produce stable supplies of nutritious food, safe air, 
clean water, climate stability, landscapes that support psychological health, etc. in 
ways that nurture civil peace without repression, stable cooperative cultures, sound 
child development, etc.  If actually possible, such production would require 
institutional economic structures to incentivize and reward large-scale efficient 
production of artificial ecosystem-service-producing capital.  This will require 
innovative ownership or financing of such capital by a diversity of novel private, 
public and partnership entities (Merk et al., 2012). 
A macroeconomic scenario dependent on successful artificial nature is illustrated in 
Figure 11.  Some time after reaching the unsustainable A’ settlement point, marked 
declines in private capital productivity initiate crises in social stability and human 
health as social, microeconomic or technical forces compel inadequate maintenance of 
natural capital systems to failure.  These disturbances may instigate investments in 
artificial ecosystem-service-producing capital, drawn as the rising curve with arrows 
pointing up and to the left in the lower right of Figure 11.  These might replace 
ecosystem services from irreversibly damaged natural systems.  As shown in Figure 11, 
such new capital’s effective production of ecosystem services may grow over time to 
gradually substitute for or replace declining services from natural capital systems.  
This might allow for stable, modest aggregate economic growth if a society can navigate 
the transition technologically, politically and institutionally. 
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Figure 11. Replacing ecosystem services from natural capital with those from fabricated 
capital. 
Figure 11 describes the necessary conditions for economic development with 
artificial nature.  Growth in private productivity supported by artificial ecosystem 
services is described by the arrows pointing up and to the right at each time step.  
Reductions in private and natural capital maintenance costs supported by artificial 
ecosystem services are described by the arrows pointing down and to the right at each 
time step.  In this idealized and highly speculative scenario, a long term trajectory 
of very gradually growing private capital productivity might occur as represented by 
the top curve at the right end of the graph. 
One problematic aspect of this Figure 11 scenario is the required long-term 
stability in the cost of artificial ecosystem-service-producing capital.  At each time 
step, the capital maintenance cost curve must keep falling (the downward pointing 
arrows) so that they cross the capital productivity curves at the settlement points 
(B’, C’, D’…) at non-declining levels.  Initially this might be plausible because 
creating some artificial natural capital might have a lower marginal cost than trying 
to repair particular hopelessly destroyed natural capital systems.  An example would be 
constructed wetlands, rain gardens and bio-swales in cities where natural hydrologic 
water-cleansing and flood-elimination systems are gone.  But the marginal cost of other 
required artificial nature technologies might prove prohibitive, as more and bigger 
natural systems fail more.  An example might be attempts to ‘sweep’ carbon out of the 
atmosphere to restore a stable and habitable climate. 
 
6.4 Debt financed natural capital investments 
Figure 12 describes a simplified, pure-case trajectory for developed economies that 
are committed to sustaining the resilience of natural capital systems but largely 
unwilling to privately finance the required investments.  This highly speculative 
scenario assumes that all necessary investments will be made to sustain natural capital 
systems’ resilience but also that short-term private capital productivity and 
profitability will be held harmless.  Virtually all the costs of these necessary and 
not discretionary investments will be financed by debt against future generations.  
These leveraged investments will include the costs of ecosystem restoration, green 
capital and artificial production of ecosystem services that are not privately 
profitable. 
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Figure 12. Trajectory with investments in natural capital and green technology financed 
mainly by public debt. 
The resulting macroeconomic behavior described by Figure 12 shows that the 
maximization of commercial services by private capital is no longer limited by the need 
to pay for the costs of natural capital resilience nor by the need to bear the 
involuntary burden of costs imposed upon private production by the consequences of 
natural capital failures.  Both of these are covered by public debt.  This pays for 
moving the economy from Point A to A’ to A” as described previously.  Without the 
burden of these costs, private capital can now grow to its new ‘settlement point’ at 
A’” where private receipts equal private costs and further growth would be 
unprofitable.  At this Point A’”, owners of private capital might succeed in unloading 
some of their private costs onto the public debt by using the argument that some of 
those costs are caused by natural capital failures which is the public sector’s fault 
and proper liability.  This additional public financing of private debt is the vertical 
cross hatched area near the top right in Figure 12.  It could allow private capital to 
grow up to the new ‘settlement point’ at A””. 
The limiting factor of private capital productivity is now the broadly shared 
service costs on the compounding debt attributable to compounding stresses on natural 
capital with attendant compounding costs for its maintenance, repair and artificial 
replacement.  These mounting debt service costs will likely inevitably and tragically 
force a decline and then crash in private capital productivity, much like that forecast 
by the basic MMERV in Figure 1, and shown in grey in Figure 12.  This decline will now 
happen later on than if the debt-financed investments in sustaining natural capital 
resilience had not been made.  At Point A””, when income from commercial services is 
entirely consumed by debt payments, the private capital economy declines precipitously.  
There is then no means to finance natural capital investments so those systems also 
decline to failure.  These costs then compound the failure of private capital in a 
death spiral. 
 
6.5 A more probable scenario 
Figure 13 depicts an over-simplified macroeconomic trajectory that may be occurring 
in some countries and perhaps for the whole earth.  The curves labeled as “initial” in 
Figure 13 correspond to the ‘natural’ economic trajectory of the basic MMERV in Figure 
1 that assumes a given state of technologies.  Rapid technological change is driving 
down private capital production costs moving that curve down to its lower track in 
Figure 13, as shown by the big solid black arrow.  At the same time, new private 
capital technologies increase productivity to raise that curve, as shown by the small 
arrows.  Together over time these provide an opportunity to produce the additional new 
wealth shaded in Figure 13, particularly for enterprises enjoying these factors.  This 
drives macroeconomic behavior to ‘settle’ at Point B.  This change in ‘natural’ 
economic behavior, by itself, will intensify stresses on ecosystems simply by 
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accelerating deployment of private capital and pushing it, and its associated stresses, 
further to the right. 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Trajectory where natural capital investments only offset increased ecosystem 
stresses enabled by private technological innovation. 
As with the basic MMERV in Figure 1, aggregate marginal private production declines 
in Figure 13 on the way toward Point B, due to the compounding pernicious effects of 
declines in natural capital health with overall loss of resilient functioning.  This 
will elicit a response, which are investments in natural capital maintenance and 
restoration in the scenario depicted in Figure 13.  These investments are assumed to be 
limited to those that are politically, socially and fiscally possible.  As drawn, they 
are only just enough to cancel the aggregate cost savings from technological innovation 
and return the total cost curve back up to where it started, as shown by the big 
striped arrow.  This drives the ‘final’ settlement point to A’ in Figure 13. 
This new ‘settlement point’ at A’ is not much different than that before 
technological innovations at Point A, as measured along the ecosystem stress gradient 
across the bottom of the graph.  The problem of sustainable development is not solved 
because Point A’ is as likely to produce ecosystems’ failure as Point A.  The 
investments in natural capital are seeking to counteract the very high ecosystem stress 
associated with Point B, that private capital is pushing toward.  These investments may 
succeed in raising the ‘final’ curve tracking ecosystem health above failure for some 
time, as shown in Figure 13.  But, the persistent growth of ecosystem stresses toward 
Point B will overwhelm the limited natural capital investments to finally tip 
ecosystems into functional failure.  This will drive the economy from Point A’ into 
collapse, as shown by the long arrow at the bottom right of Figure 13. 
Figure 14 shows how this macroeconomic trajectory is a bit better than the ‘natural’ 
trajectory in Figure 1.  Although both trajectories end in economic collapse, the new 
Figure 14 trajectory produces unsustainable gains in both private and natural capital 
production and a forestalled collapse.  The owners and beneficiaries of private capital 
innovation enjoy the gains denoted by the grid-shaded area while the economy still 
lives.  But, in the end, the same value of these gains is lost across the larger 
economy as wasted general public expenditures. 
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Figure 14. Wealth effects and production gains and losses along logical time for the 
trajectory in Figure 13. 
If the growth in private productivity attributable to technical innovations were 
much greater than drawn in Figures 13 and 14, that would raise that curve higher up the 
graph, further in the direction of the small arrows.  This would drive the new 
settlement point (A’) along the cost curve up and to the right.  Ecosystem stress would 
therefore be even higher than at Point A’ in Figures 13 and 14, and the same 
unsustainable scenario would still apply. 
 
7. Discussion 
The handful of projected macroeconomic scenarios graphed and introduced above are 
only a few selected relatively pure-case examples.  Future economic evolution, and 
further theoretical proposals, may combine elements from all or some, and others not 
developed here, in complex ways.  All these will grapple with the emerging vexing and 
intractable conflict between powerful private capital and wealth versus public capital 
and health derived from self-organizing environmental, cultural and institutional 
complex systems that are declining in power and viability. 
 
7.1 The biggest core problem 
The least developed aspect of the MMERV, and the most likely grounds for its 
rejection, is an inadequate understanding of the economic processes of catastrophic 
social collapse.  This strong possibility is a distinctly fundamental tenant of the 
MMERV, but is largely assumed and not described or modeled in any specific way.  
Environmental scientists and ecological economists have not adequately hypothesized a 
‘snowballing’ of ecosystem failures to explore and develop a theory of future processes 
of social collapse attributable to climate change with lost ecosystem services 
(Timmerman, 1981; Davidson, 2010).  Just how might natural capital failures gather and 
compound each other in complex ways to produce a downward positive feedback spiral.  
There are certainly many vague claims and ideas about this process in the literature, 
and relevant broadly conceptual (and non-catastrophic) theories of resilience and 
panarchy (e.g. Holling et al., 2002; Benson, 2014).  But these do not describe the 
economic process of compounding self-organizing system failures in enough theoretical 
detail to design the efficient and effective investments in natural capital that the 
MMERV suggests must be implemented (Mennell, 1990).  This is the greatest weakness of 
the MMERV and the usefulness of the analyses presented herein. 
 
7.2 Summary 
The MMERV offers a graphical model of aggregate relationships among essential 
macroeconomic variables to aid clear thinking about alternative pathways of economic 
behavior.  Trade-offs between private and natural capital productivity and attendant 
 16 
gains and costs are formally described showing that financial ‘dead weight’ investments 
in natural capital are required along with employment of truly ‘green’ technologies.  
Successful maintenance of natural capital health entails lost new private wealth but 
significant new wealth might be retained if that maintenance proves to be efficient and 
effective, but not over-reaching (Bretschger and Pattakou, 2018).  The private sector 
must forgo short-term production and new wealth to prevent long-term economic and civil 
collapse to chaos with massive losses of private wealth and repression of freedoms.  
Long-term, lesser but sustainable gains in wealth creation can accrue from economic 
activities investing in both private and natural capital. 
This long-term result will entail incessant innovations in both private green 
capital and natural capital maintenance, and will need to include some wholly 
artificial production of ecosystem services.  It will also entail wealth transfers from 
traditional owners and workers to many new owners and workers in natural capital 
maintenance enterprises.  Such workers will need to be so employed as private 
production of marketable goods becomes highly automated. 
 
7.3 Sensitivity issues in modeling and forecasting 
All the short- and long-term theoretical scenarios herein are highly sensitive to 
two types of reality checks.  The first is more precision about the shape and 
interaction of all the curves up to the various ‘settlement points’ in the MMERV.  
Researchers need to estimate these using new biometric and econometric methods that 
couple economic and biological systems and incorporate the direct and indirect impacts 
of lost ecosystem services on net aggregate private capital productivity.  These 
specifications can enable and profoundly effect estimates of just where different 
economies and the planetary economy ‘sit’ along the macroeconomic behavioral paths 
posited by the MMERV.  The interaction of private capital production and natural 
capital health and productivity described by the MMERV is likely to be generally 
verified but better understanding of the magnitude of this interaction and how marginal 
changes in one relate to the other over time might be profoundly informative.  
Estimates of the shape of the aggregate ‘natural’ cost curve and its potential shifts 
in relation to the other curves are critical, difficult to make, and would also be 
profoundly informative. 
The second type of reality check is more difficult to investigate but no less 
important.  Research is needed to estimate the likelihood and ‘friction’ that different 
long-term adjustments to the MMERV’s curves will encounter, and how these adjustments 
interact (Figures 9-13).  Is it possible to continually reduce the impact of 
increasingly commercially productive capital on natural capital resilience?  Is it 
possible to continually invest economic resources in maintaining and restoring the 
resilient productivity of natural capital in increasingly efficient ways in spite of 
often novel and rapidly evolving stresses from new forms of private capital and ongoing 
and compounding stresses from legacy insults to natural capital?  Can the costs of both 
the above economic sectors continuously be reduced?  Can the introduction of fabricated 
capital to ‘artificially’ produce ecosystem services -- instead of from complex, self-
organizing systems -- actually aid in the achievement of the goals implied in all the 
above questions? 
 
7.4. Other challenges 
Technical and institutional challenges in maintaining natural capital resilience are 
daunting and manifest everywhere (Ostrom et al., 2002).  The most efficient investments 
in resilience and green technology -- to produce the trajectory in Figure 5 – may still 
produce a net very-substantial drop in private capital productivity if the unavoidable 
trade-offs between private and natural capital productivity are too large to be 
successfully negotiated.  Losses in new private wealth may then be unacceptable to most 
people in spite of the potential long-term benefits in avoiding social collapse. 
The sustainable pathways of macroeconomic evolution suggested by Figures 9-13 are 
also highly problematic.  They require that constantly increasing innovations in 
natural capital maintenance and replacement obey a kind of Moore’s law for the 
production of ecosystem services.  This seems unlikely in this non-information-science 
realm.  Such rapid changes in natural capital systems would certainly not constitute a 
return to historical forms of robustly stable and self-maintaining ecosystems.  The 
kinds of economic trajectories suggested by Figures 9-11 also require that innovations 
and problem solving in both private and natural capital productivity be funded by a 
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tenuously maintained modest flow of normal profits.  Such available resources, 
representing a small fraction of  total economic production, may prove to be too small 
and unstable to reliably sustain ecosystem services. 
The MMERV graphs offered here pose a question about whether private capital owners 
and consumers of its products will tolerate net losses in production and profits needed 
to lift the future health of natural capital from failure to resilience.  Will they 
find diversions of resources to natural capital investments so intolerable and 
unreasonable as to warrant rebellion?  Research should estimate actual short-term 
profit losses and consequent long-term gains in natural capital health.  Studies should 
investigate voters’ and private capital owners’ perceptions of such trade-offs, the 
acceptability of the constraints and common costs they entail, and whether the 
necessary policies can attain sufficient behavioral compliance to be effective. 
 
7.5. Tendentious economic laws 
The form and interpretation of the MMERV will undoubtedly be controversial and 
subject to contentious critiques and revisions.  These will center on two major 
‘economic laws’ implicated by the MMERV: (1) Natural capital resilience cannot be 
achieved while simultaneously maximizing the creation of short-term commercial 
production.  (2) Catastrophic failure of natural capital systems can and will occur in 
the foreseeable future with catastrophic consequences upon commerce, freedoms and other 
vital social systems. 
Conventional economists will insist that valid macroeconomic science will always 
best describe only the left-hand, growing-private-production part of all the graphs 
offered herein.  These claims, based on historically powerful factors, will effectively 
assert that the frontier easy-growth phase of economic history, with always incidental 
and essentially insubstantial externality costs, provides the only powerful and 
enduring description of economic problems.  They will assert that catastrophic failure 
of natural capital systems is either impossible or of little ultimate consequence. 
The third major economic law implicated by the MMERV is that very substantial 
investments in natural capital maintenance and very low impact private technologies are 
both required to produce sustainable economies.  This law is much less controversial 
until it is understood in the light of the first two laws sketched above. 
 
7.6. Some tendentious assumptions 
The MMERV assumes that investments in natural capital health can produce the benefit 
of restored ecosystems’ resilience while effecting only comparatively small declines in 
private capital production of commercial goods and services.  This assumes that the 
redirection of resources away from private to public capital investments will be 
efficient in picking only the low-hanging fruit of ecosystem restoration achievements 
while only sacrificing the least-cost private productivity.  It also assumes that such 
trade-off choices will not unavoidably and fundamentally undermine the future 
productivity of private capital.  The first assumption relies on an expectation that 
public-interest institutions will be powerful in wise, incorruptible, and fair ways 
contrary to history and human nature.  The second assumption requires that vital 
natural resources for private capital will always be found and exploited in places and 
ways that do not destroy the vitality of critical ecosystems, contrary to the 
likelihood that most all such places have already played out. 
The MMERV’s greatest essential and durable value lies in bringing natural capital, 
its products, its reformulated value metric, and its maintenance fully and rigorously 
into macroeconomic theory and discourse.  The MMERV’s greatest weaknesses will not 
likely be within the limited, self-defined scope of macroeconomic theory.  These will 
instead be the theory’s failure to incorporate other forms of un-owned social and 
public capital besides natural capital.  Such other productive capital capacities 
include self-organizing and regulating social systems that produce and evolve well 
behaved and self-regulating humane cultures, civil peace without repression, democratic 
institutions, fair and not overwhelmed justice systems, strong education, healthy human 
development, beauty, and peaceful relations among nations. 
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